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ABSTRACT 
Central Bank Forecasts and Disclosure Policy:  
Why it Pays to be Optimistic 
In a simple macromodel with forward-looking expectations, this Paper looks 
into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future 
shocks. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future 
shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as it 
impairs stabilization of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when 
there is no credibility problem or the central bank’s preference is common 
knowledge. When there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preference 
shock, and this uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance 
disclosure does not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong 
dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central 
bank actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price 
stability in subsequent periods. Another implication of the model is that, in 
contrast to forecasts of current period shocks emphasized by the literature, 
forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy 
choices because the central bank refrains from responding to its own 
forecasts. 
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In practice, central banks and the private sector spend a lot of resources in
their forecasting activities and in assessing the views and forecasts of each
other. For some reasons though, central bank forecasts outperform those
of the private sector, an indication perhaps of central bank’s superior infor-
mation about the future state of the economy, including the state of shocks
aﬀecting economic activity. In their empirical analysis on diﬀerences between
commercial and Federal Reserve (Fed for short) forecasts, Romer and Romer
(2000) conclude that ”the most important ﬁnding ... is that the Federal Re-
serve appears to possess information about the future state of the economy
that is not known to market participants.” (p.455), (emphasis ours).1
While surveys of private sector (commercial) forecasts, such as the Fed’s
”Beige Book” and the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, are fre-
quently released, some central banks are reluctant to disclose without delay
their own internal forecasts.2 Recently, some theoretical research has been
done on the welfare eﬀects of disclosing in advance central bank informa-
tion about the state of the economy.3 The literature has explored this issue
in the context of private information about shocks to current inﬂation and
output, with mixed results. In a setup where private sector inﬂation expec-
tations are not forward looking, Cukierman (2001) shows that a central bank
can improve stabilization policy by withholding forecasts of current supply
shocks.4 The negative result holds for alternative monetary transmission
mechanisms – one with a Lucas-type supply function and the other a variant
of the backward-looking model of Svensson (1997) with its main feature of
time lags from the policy instrument to policy goals. However, Geraats (2001)
reverses the negative results shown in Cukierman (2001) by introducing un-
1In the case of the Federal Reserve, Romer and Romer (2000) discuss some of the
reasons for higher quality forecasts, including inside information about future monetary
policy, access to oﬃcial and unoﬃcial data, and enormous devotion of resources.
2In this case, for instance, the Beige Book, which summarizes information gathered by
each Federal Reserve Bank through reports from Bank and Branch directors and interviews
with key business contacts, market experts and other sources, is published immediately.
However, the Fed does not disclose immediately its staﬀ forecasts of the U.S. economy,
reported in the ”Green Book”. The Green Book is made public only with a lag of ﬁve
years.
3In the terminology of Geraats (2001), the release of internal forecasts is part of what
she calls economic transparency. She discusses several aspects of transparency including
political (formal goals, numerical targets), economic (data, models, forecasts), operational
(control errors, transmission shocks), procedural (minutes of meeting, voting), and policy
(statements, inclination).
4See also Gersbach (2003) for similar results.
2observed inﬂation targets and credibility issues in a two-period framework.
The argument is that, since the public is assumed to observe current central
bank actions, it is in the interest of the central bank to invest in reputation
in the ﬁrst period in order to have more ﬂexibility in the second period. The
signaling quality of current actions about the unobserved inﬂation target is
better if the public has information about current shocks that the central
bank is responding to.5
In a two-period New-Keynesian framework that features unobserved output
target, Jensen (2000) shows how releasing forecasts of current shocks dis-
torts stabilization policy, even though it solves the credibility problem. Like
Geraats, Jensen assumes that the public observes central bank actions before
forming inﬂation expectations, and thus with high degree of transparency
about current shocks, inﬂation expectations become extremely sensitive to
the central bank’s current action. But, here comes the diﬀerence, in order to
stabilize inﬂation expectations, policy tilts heavily towards inﬂation stabiliza-
tion, making output very volatile. Thus transparency could be undesirable
for a central banker who enjoys good initial reputation.
A common feature of the above cited papers is that, if the central bank’s
targets for inﬂation and output are common knowledge, then its forecasts of
current period shocks can perfectly be inferred from its actions. The reason
is that, even if the public does not observe them directly, the central bank
reacts to current period shocks, as these shocks disrupt the level of current
inﬂation and output that the central bank wants to stabilize.6
This paper considers instead forecasts of future shocks when markets are
forward-looking. Disclosure policy on forecasts of future shocks is analyzed
5In a cross-section study using 87 countries Chortareas et al. (2002) ﬁnd that publica-
tion of forecasts reduces average inﬂation. Geraats and Eijﬃnger (2004) use time-series
data on several aspects of transparency for nine major central banks, based on an index
of transparency constructed by Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2004), and conclude that higher
transparency is associated with lower short-term as well as long-term interest rates, thus
lending support to the positive reputational eﬀects of releasing forecasts, as argued by
Geraats (2001).
6Among other things, the paper by Geraats (2001) diﬀers from Jensen (2000) in the
eﬀect of direct revelation of the unobserved target. In Geraats (2001), this leads to worse
outcomes because the credibility problem would remain unresolved. This result seems
at odds with the recent calls for transparency about inﬂation goals (e.g. Rogoﬀ (2003)).
In Jensen (2000), transparency through direct revelation of central bank preferences may
dominate transparency through the release of forecasts if the central bank has good rep-
utation and stabilization policy has more importance.
3under the New-Keynesian view of the macroeconomy (see for e.g. Clarida
et al. (1999), King (2000) and McCallum and Nelson (2000)). It shows that
immediate disclosure of these shocks can have implications diﬀerent from
forecasts of current shocks.7 The main result is that, when there is no cred-
ibility problem or the central bank’s output target is common knowledge,
advance disclosure of future shocks makes the central bank worse oﬀ. As
such a central bank may have the incentive to delay disclosure until after
private sector expectations are formed. In turn this may improve stabiliza-
tion of current inﬂation and output. For this result to hold, it must be
common knowledge that the central bank has better quality signals about
future shocks. Advance disclosure of future shocks does not aﬀect current
outcomes if the central bank’s output target remains private information.
Moreover, in contrast to forecasts of current period shocks, forecasts of future
shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy choices because
the central bank refrains from responding to its own forecasts. The central
bank may withhold its information about future shocks and imitate the less
informed public without the fear of revealing that information by its current
actions.
We ﬁrst present a benchmark case where the central bank’s preference is
common knowledge. In this environment, transparency about future shocks
makes the central bank worse oﬀ if the central bank has goals besides price
stability. In this case adverse supply shocks aﬀect all goal variables, and
knowing this, expected movements in future supply shocks make private sec-
tor inﬂation expectations to be more volatile. This eﬀect passes to current
prices through expectations of future inﬂation. It may thus be better from
the perspective of the central bank to wait until the information about future
supply shocks does not have any value to the private sector. This ensures
that public expectations of future shocks are less volatile than when a more
accurate information about future shocks is available.8
The benchmark case is then modiﬁed in some ways. First, instead of dis-
cretionary policy, the central bank is assumed to commit credibly to some
state contingent rule. However, this modiﬁcation does not change the neg-
7The strategic role of private information about future shocks increases if the informa-
tion asymmetry regarding future shocks is more severe than the corresponding asymmetry
for current period shocks.
8In this sense, this paper agrees with the remark by Mishkin (2004) that even if openness
is a virtue, for example when central banks are transparent about their long-term inﬂation
goals, some types of transparency may not further social objectives.
4ative result found under the benchmark case. Next, the paper introduces
unobservability of central bank preferences and reputational considerations.
The eﬀects of this modiﬁcation depends on whether the uncertainty due to
current period shifts in the target is resolved in the next period. If so, then
it is not desirable to disclose forecasts of next period supply shocks. On the
other hand, if current period shifts in the target are not known in the next
period, reputational considerations do not play a role as far as disclosure
policy regarding future shocks is concerned. Thus, a policy of secrecy weakly
dominates a policy of immediate disclosure.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environ-
ment for the New-Keynesian transmission mechanism, where inﬂation and
output are determined by forward looking inﬂation expectations. In section
3 we analyze optimal monetary policy under discretion, with and without
disclosure of information. Moreover, the eﬀects of secrecy on the behavior
of the nominal rate of interest is discussed. Section 4 analyzes transparency
under limited commitment, where the results are basically similar to the dis-
cretionary, full information case of section 3. In section 5, the signiﬁcance of
uncertainty about central bank output target is explored in a multi-period
framework with signaling, closely following Jensen (2000). We consider two
cases with diﬀering implications on disclosure policy: in the ﬁrst case, un-
certainty about shifts in the current output target are resolved in the next
period while in the second case the uncertainty stays during the next period.
Concluding remarks are given in section 6.
2 Forward-Looking Inﬂation Expectations
As we indicated in the introduction, the New-Keynesian view of the macroe-
conomy gives a prominent role to private sector expectations of future in-
ﬂation and output in the determination of current inﬂation and output. A
detailed description of the workhorse model can be found, for example, in
Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000).
On the supply side, a forward looking Phillips equation determines inﬂation
πt = βE
p
t πt+1 + λxt + ut (1)
where π is the inﬂation rate, x is the output gap, and u is a zero-mean
stochastic shock to inﬂation. The parameters β and λ satisfy 0 < β < 1
and λ > 0 . E
p
t πt+1 stands for private sector (PS) expectations of next pe-
riod’s inﬂation conditional on available information at time t. Thus inﬂation
5depends on forward looking PS expectations, the output gap and inﬂation
shock.9
Likewise the dynamics of output demand is governed by a forward looking
relationship (the so called intertemporal IS equation)
xt = E
p
txt+1 − φ(it − E
p
tπt+1) + vt (2)
where i is the nominal interest rate and v is an i.i.d shock to aggregate
demand. The parameter φ satisﬁes φ > 0. Thus the current output gap
depends on PS expectations of next period’s output gap, the real interest
rate, it − E
p
tπt+1, and a demand shock.
Optimal policy is characterized as the choice of the current short-term nomi-
nal interest rate that minimizes the variability in inﬂation and output relative







with α denoting the weight the CB places on output stabilization goal rel-
ative to inﬂation stabilization. For simplicity the target rate of inﬂation is
normalized to zero. Moreover since the central bank targets the equilibrium
level of output, we also normalize the output gap target to zero. In the
model of this section the CB is assumed to have a more accurate forecast
of the cost-push shocks ut and ut+1 so that it can track their developments
better than the PS. For simplicity, the CB has perfect information about
both shocks while the PS knows their probability distributions only.10
Except for information asymmetry regarding the shocks, and current inﬂation
and output, there is common knowledge of the CB’s loss function, including
the targets for inﬂation and output and the preference parameter α. For the
moment we abstract from inﬂation bias considerations, as the CB targets
equilibrium output, which is not unrealistic given the widely accepted asser-
tions about the prestige of major CBs.11 Credibility issues are discussed in
section 5.
9When prices are sticky, price setters can not fully adjust to current shocks. Thus ex-
pectations about future prices (and therefore inﬂation) play an important role in aﬀecting
current inﬂation.
10This simpliﬁcation, although not realistic, is innocuous to our result. All we need is
for the CB to do better in tracking the movement of shocks.
11For some forceful arguments against the literature on inﬂationary bias, see McCallum
(1995) and Blinder (1998). In the case of the Fed, Bernanke (2003) and Romer and Romer
(2000) discuss the reputation that the Fed has gained over the past two decades.
63 Disclosure policy under discretion
Under discretionary policy, the CB minimizes (3) period-by-period after PS
expectations are formed, thus the term E
p
t πt+1 in the Phillips equation (1)
is taken as a ﬁxed parameter.12 Since the CB takes PS expectations as






According to (4), in each period, the central bank contracts (expands) current
output in response to a higher (lower) rate of inﬂation. In essence, the CB is
reacting to any variable that directly or indirectly aﬀects current inﬂation.
For example if inﬂation expectations increase for no fundamental reason,
current inﬂation will go up if the CB does not react. The optimality rule
ensures that this situation does not materialize because the CB is willing
and able to contract current output to ease the burden of the shocks on
the current rate of inﬂation. The above optimality condition is related to
what Lars Svensson calls a ”targeting rule”, a rule expressed in terms of
the goal variables (inﬂation and output), and derived from a well-deﬁned
objective function. It diﬀers from an ”instrument rule” that describes a
reaction function for the nominal rate of interest (the instrument of monetary
policy).14 The next step is to determine PS inﬂation expectations. Since the







α + λ2ut (5)
This equation shows clearly that the evolution of actual inﬂation depends
on currently held PS expectations about future inﬂation and on the current
realization of the exogenous shock ut. In this setting, PS expectations of
πt+1 are ultimately determined by their forecasts of ut+1. Thus the role of
forecasts of the shocks is clear, and any information that improves the PS’s
forecast accuracy with respect to these shocks is valuable. The mechanism by
which any private information about forecasts of future shocks aﬀect current
12Thus the timing of events is such that the CB chooses its interest rate policy for
the current period after observing PS inﬂation expectations, and current and next period
shocks; see for e.g. Cukierman (2001).
13For convenience the problem is solved in two steps. Once the optimal paths for inﬂation
and output are known in the ﬁrst step, the optimal instrument path for the nominal rate
can be found from the IS equation (2).
14See for e.g. Svensson (2003).
7inﬂation outcomes can be shown easily for the simple case where the shocks
are white noise with mean zero and ﬁnite standard deviation.
Disclosing ut+1 → E
p
t πt+1 = f(ut+1) → πt = g(ut+1)
Withholding ut+1 → E
p
t πt+1 = 0 → πt  = g(ut+1)
3.1 Transparency about current and future shocks
First, following the literature, the disclosure of current shocks ut is consid-
ered. Then we modify this case by allowing disclosure of ut+1. The shocks are
assumed to come from a white noise process, a speciﬁcation that is common
in the transparency literature.15 But it turns out that with forward looking
PS expectations, allowing for some persistence in the shocks matters for the
results.16 It will be shown that under i.i.d shocks the CB is indiﬀerent to dis-
closing information about ut because it knows that the PS is forward looking
and the release of information about ut does not change the PS’s outlook
about ut+1. Accordingly, stabilization policy is not aﬀected by disclosure
policy about ut.
With this idea in mind, we can now solve the model for E
p
tπt+1 and derive the
rational expectations equilibrium, where we note that the only relevant state
variables are ut and ut+1. Using the commonly used method of undetermined
coeﬃcients,17 we start from equation (5) and guess that
πt = θ1ut + θ2ut+1 (6)
Then disclosure policy about ut and ut+1 and PS rational expectations imply
E
p
t πt+1 = θ1E
p
t ut+1 (7)
Based on disclosure policy of the CB, we have either E
p
tπt+1 = 0, reﬂecting
the fact that the PS takes the expected value of the i.i.d shock when no
15The recent literature on discretion and commitment in a New-Keynesian framework
sometimes assumes an i.i.d speciﬁcation (for instance, Woodford (1999b)).
16Thus we touch upon the eﬀects of alternative processes for the shocks. In order to
capture the nature of persistence in a simple way, we use a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. As
a matter of fact, however, using US data, Adam and Milli (2003) ﬁnd that the persistence
parameter is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
17McCallum (1983) emphasizes on solving the model using only the fundamentals of the
economy (in this case ut and ut+1), avoiding bubble solutions. McCallum calls this the
Minimal State Variables (MSV) method.
8information is provided by the CB, or E
p
tπt+1 = θ1ut+1 when information is
released. Note in this case that the release of ut is redundant as it does not
help the PS in forecasting ut+1. Replacing (7) in (5) under secrecy the actual
law of motion of inﬂation is
πt =
α
α + λ2ut (8)
which makes it vivid that current inﬂation is insulated from the eﬀects of
next period shocks. Consistency between equation (8) and the guessed form
(6) implies θ1 = α
α+λ2 and θ2 = 0.
The solution for the output gap is18
xt = −
λ
α + λ2ut (9)
Unlike the PS, which expects zero inﬂation for the next period, the CB has
perfect foresight, so that its inﬂation expectations ﬂuctuates in tandem with
movements in upcoming shocks.
E
c
tπt+1 = πt+1 =
α
α + λ2ut+1 (10)
Next consider the case of transparency about ut+1. Since the PS is interested
in forecasting ut+1, any information available to the CB about next period
shocks is valuable to the PS. So suppose that in addition to releasing data on
ut, the CB is considering to disclose forecasts of ut+1.19 If the PS has access
to CB’s information about ut+1, then (5) will be
πt =
αβ
α + λ2θ1ut+1 +
α
α + λ2ut (11)




α + λ2 θ2 =
α2β
(α + λ2)2
18These solutions are identical to equations (15) and (16) of McCallum and Nelson
(2000).
19Note here that we are following the literature in assuming that the shocks are i.i.d,
but at the same time diﬀering from it by giving the CB extra advantage in forecasting
ut+1.
9The reduced form equations are
πt =
α
α + λ2ut +
α2β
(α + λ2)2ut+1 (12)
xt = −
λ
α + λ2ut −
αβλ
(α + λ2)2ut+1 (13)
We can easily see that current inﬂation and output levels are aﬀected not
only by current period shocks, but also by future shocks, as a result of their
release to the public. Thus releasing information regarding ut+1 makes cur-








α + λ2ut+1 (14)
which diﬀers from the case of secrecy as far as PS expectations are concerned.
Note also that, a transparent CB does worse than a secretive CB in forecast-
ing next period’s inﬂation (compare (10) and (14)).
It is straightforward to show that the above negative result also holds when
the CB’s loss function includes additional goals, such as concerns for insta-
bility in interest rates, as emphasized by some, including Cukierman (2001),
Goodhart (1998) and Woodford (1999a).
Summarizing, when the shocks are i.i.d, the solutions for inﬂation and out-
put depend on the degree of transparency about ut+1, but not about ut. The
main culprit for the increased volatility under transparency is the variation
in PS inﬂation expectations. Thus it is optimal from the CB’s point of view
that the PS expects inﬂation in the next period to be zero although in reality
it may not be so. The CB knows the current error in PS forecasts but is not
willing to disclose any information before period t+1 arrives or, equivalently,
before PS expectations are set and policy actions taken.
The preceding analysis shows that if the shocks are white noise, as the liter-
ature on transparency commonly assumes, then disclosure of ut is irrelevant
for PS forecasts of future inﬂation. This feature of the forward looking mar-
kets is absent in the Lucas-type transmission mechanism. At the same time,
unlike our results, early disclosure of future shocks do not matter for optimal
stabilization when the model is not forward looking. Another feature that
diﬀerentiates the forward looking framework from the static one is related to
10the properties of the shocks. To be speciﬁc, when markets are forward look-
ing, disclosure of ut matters if there is persistence in the time series behavior
of the shocks. To see this suppose, instead of white noise, the shocks follow a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive (in short AR(1)) process ut+1 = ρut+ǫt+1 where ρ is
common knowledge and ǫt+1 is an i.i.d innovation to time t+1 shocks. Then
if the CB releases data on ut, PS forecasts of ut+1 will be ρut, which is con-
ditional on observing ut in period t. Accordingly, with the shocks showing
some persistence overtime, information about current realizations improve
our forecasts for the next period. This shows that, in principle, in a forward
looking economic environment, the irrelevance of transparency about ut is
not a general result, and depends on speciﬁc assumptions.
3.2 Interest rate behavior
As it was indicated in the introduction, the transparency literature focuses
on disclosure of current shocks. An implication of this is that current policy
choices may partly reveal to the public the CB’s private information. In the
New-Keynesian framework with private information on future shocks, cur-
rent period action does not give a signal of the CB’s private information for
two reasons. First, as the Phillips and IS equations show, optimal policy
reacts to PS expectations of inﬂation and output, which under secrecy do
not depend on the CB’s information about ut+1. Second, unlike ut, which
directly aﬀects current inﬂation irrespective of PS expectations, the CB does
not need to react to ut+1. As can be seen from the case of secrecy (see (8)
and (9)), the information advantage of the CB with respect to ut+1 is not
revealed even ex post. Intuitively, under no disclosure policy, the PS does
not know the realization of ut+1, although it knows that the CB has that
information. The best it can do is therefore to set expectations based on the
unconditional distribution of the shocks.
To see the implications for the nominal interest rate of not releasing the
forecasts of ut+1, use the equilibrium solution for output and PS expectations
in the IS equation and solve for the interest rate rule that implements optimal





20Observe that the demand shock does not give rise to a tradeoﬀ in stabilizing inﬂation
and output since the implied adjustment in interest rates to changes in demand shock
moves output and inﬂation in the same direction. That is why in equilibrium, output and
inﬂation are independent of the demand shock.
11Thus in equilibrium the rate of interest depends only on current shocks, re-
ﬂecting the fact that the CB does not react to its private information about
next period shocks. Even if the CB announces its interest rate target for pe-
riod t, there is no way that the CB can reveal its private information by its
current actions. This is true even if the PS knows as much as the CB about
the latter’s loss function, including the targets for inﬂation and output and
the relative weight on output stabilization. In this respect, Svensson (2003)
argues that the best way to make the CB’s forecasts observable to the public
is by revealing the CB’s model, information, assumptions and judgments.
In previous studies on transparency of current shocks, knowledge of the loss
function enables the PS to infer ex post the CB’s private information. In our
case, revelation of its loss function may not help at all in knowing the CB’s
private information about future shocks.
4 Disclosure policy under limited commitment
The classic theory of time-inconsistency in monetary policy rationalizes the
high inﬂation period of the 1970s by the discretionary behavior of CBs. The
term ”inﬂation bias” was coined to underscore the implication of the theory
that absent rules based monetary policy, equilibrium inﬂation turns out to
be above the socially optimal level. The reason lies in the temptation of
monetary authorities (due to unrealistic output or employment target) to
renege on their plans once PS expectations are set. With forward looking
expectations emphasized by the New-Keynesian view of the macroeconomy,
we may have not only an inﬂation bias, but also a ”stabilization bias” as a
result of discretionary policy. Even without the inﬂation bias problem, mon-
etary authorities would like the PS to believe that policy will be strongly
anti-inﬂationary in the sense of stabilizing inﬂation but once PS inﬂation
expectations are manipulated this way, the authorities will have an incentive
(if they are free to do so) not to stabilize inﬂation strongly, contrary to their
plans. Knowing this fact, the PS will set inﬂation expectations such that the
discretionary equilibrium is the only result.
If the CB can not credibly commit to keeping inﬂation variability low in
the future there by losing power to anchor inﬂation expectations, then pol-
icy ends up being discretionary, in eﬀect minimizing current period’s welfare
levels. The crucial observation we made in the case of discretionary policy is
that the CB would like to see that ﬂuctuations in PS inﬂation expectations
are minimized. In this situation the CB will do anything that makes inﬂation
12expectations less variable. If it has private information about future devel-
opments of the economy, it will refrain from disclosing those information to
the public, as we have shown in the case of cost-push shocks.
This section shows that the undesirable property of transparency about fu-
ture shocks is not unique to discretionary policy. Even if the CB were to
follow a policy based on some rules, it would still favor secrecy. The reason
lies on the fact that transparency always impairs the CB’s ability to stabi-
lize current inﬂation and output because PS expectations add volatility to
current inﬂation irrespective of the policy regime.
4.1 Commitment for a transparent CB
A simple way to appreciate the gains from some form of commitment would
be to consider a transparent regime about the shock ut+1. The question is
then, can the CB improve stabilization policy if it has the ability to commit
to a given policy rule? The answer is, yes. To make it speciﬁc, suppose
the CB can commit credibly to a simple policy rule that takes the same
form as (13). Although this is a sort of limited commitment, as we have
constrained the CB to follow a rule that has a particular form, it serves to
show the beneﬁts from commitment. The idea is to see if a transparent CB
can improve welfare by committing to a simple rule within the same class of
rules derived under discretion. Thus consider a commitment to the following
rule
xt = −Aut − But+1 (15)
where the weights A and B are to be chosen optimally by the CB. Then from
(15) (and see Appendix) PS expectations for output and inﬂation follow
E
p
t xt+1 = −Aut+1 E
p
t πt+1 = (1 − λA)ut+1
These expressions show clearly that the CB’s choice of a particular value for A
will directly aﬀect PS inﬂation and output expectations, and via the Phillips
and IS equations, current inﬂation and output. Using the expression for
E
p
t πt+1 in the Phillips equation (1) the reduced form expression for inﬂation,
under commitment to the simple rule, will be
πt = (1 − λA)ut + (β(1 − λA) − λB)ut+1 (16)
13Given the choices for the values of A and B, the dynamics of output and
inﬂation is governed by (15) and (16). We can now express the expected loss
as a function of the parameters A and B
ELt = ((1 − λA)
2 + αA









λ[λ2 + α(1 + β2)]










αλ2β2 + (α + λ2)2
The ﬁrst observation is that both of these coeﬃcients diﬀer from their coun-
terparts under discretion with transparency (see equation (13)), showing the
CB could improve up on the discretionary equilibrium by following a simple
state-contingent rule that takes the same form as the discretionary solution
but with diﬀerent weights placed on the current versus forecasted shocks.
Moreover, as long as α  = 0, that is the CB cares about output stabilization
as well as inﬂation stabilization, A∗ is larger than its corresponding coeﬃ-
cient while B∗ is smaller than its corresponding coeﬃcient. This means that
under commitment to the simple target rule (15) policy responds more ag-
gressively to current shock realizations ut but less aggressively to upcoming
shock innovations ut+1. The intuition for this result is that with partial com-
mitment, a more aggressive policy in terms of contracting aggregate demand
in reaction to current shocks leads the PS to expect aggressive policy in the
next period, thus lowering their inﬂation expectations. This in turn dampens
the eﬀect of future shocks on current inﬂation. Thus the CB can aﬀord to be
less aggressive with respect to future shocks because the PS does part of the
job by adjusting its expectations. Knowing the value of A∗, the reduced-form





α + λ2ut+1 H ≡ 1 −
αβ2λ2
αβ2λ2 + (α + λ2)2
Since H satisﬁes 0 < H < 1, PS inﬂation expectations respond less strongly
to future shocks than is the case under discretion. This outcome arises from
the CB’s commitment to react more strongly to current shocks. If this com-
mitment is credible, the PS expects a strong reaction to next period shocks
when the time arrives. This in turn lowers inﬂation expectations and current
14inﬂation.
For equilibrium inﬂation we have
πt =
α
(α + λ2) + (α + λ2)−1αβ2λ2ut +
α2β
(α + λ2)2 + αβ2λ2ut+1 (18)
Note that, compared to discretion, a policy of limited commitment results
in less variability in the dynamics of inﬂation (compare (12) and (18)). This
behavior contrasts with output, which is more volatile with respect to the
current shock but responds less strongly to next period’s shocks. Although
this might make one conclude that the net eﬀect of limited commitment on
CB loss function is not clear, it should be obvious that limited commitment
improves welfare. Why else would the CB choose diﬀerent coeﬃcients under
limited commitment although the simple rule (15) falls under the class of
rules derived from the discretionary solution? For the sake of completeness,
however, we compare the expected losses in both regimes. Let T stand for











α2(1 + β2) + αλ2
(α + λ2)2 + αβ2λ2 Q
T
d ≡
α(α2β2 + (α + λ2)2)
(α + λ2)3









(α(1 + β2) + λ2)(α + λ2)3 > 1
4.2 The gains from secrecy under limited commitment
What we have shown so far is that given its decision to release internal
forecasts, especially about ut+1, to the public, the CB is able to improve
macroeconomic outcomes by credibly committing to a simple rule that reacts
to those shocks. But, can the CB do even better by not releasing information
about ut+1 and committing to a simpler rule? We can easily show that this
is possible. For instance, the CB will gain by not releasing ut+1 and simply
announcing the following policy rule
xt = −Aut (19)
which is nothing but has the same form as the solution for discretion without
transparency about u+1. As it turns out, the CB will optimally choose a
15value for A that is identical to the corresponding coeﬃcient under discretion.
Why? The reason lies in the fact that PS inﬂation expectations are always
zero because of the policy of secrecy by the CB, it is fairly easy to show that
the CB’s incentives do not change by this form of change in policy regime.
To see this take PS expectations of output
E
p
t xt+1 = −AE
p
t ut+1 = 0
No matter what value the CB assigns to A, the PS always expect next period’s
output gap to be zero. In other words the CB can choose to be, say, more
aggressive in responding to today’s realizations of the cost push shock than
it did under discretion. Nevertheless, the PS can not be made to expect
anything other than a zero level of output for tomorrow since its forecast of
zero cost-push shocks makes the CB’s aggressive behavior with respect to ut
to be irrelevant in aﬀecting expectations of future inﬂation. Moreover, PS
inﬂation expectations are zero (see Appendix)
E
p
t πt+1 = (1 − λA)E
p
t ut+1 = 0
Given the fact that PS expectations of inﬂation and output are zero, the
CB will choose a value for A equal to the value realized under discretion,
λ/(α+λ2). With the simple rule (19) followed by the CB, inﬂation will take
the form
πt = (1 − λA)ut
Expressing the expected loss as a function of A





and minimizing (20) with respect to A, it is easy to show that the optimal
value of A is λ/(α + λ2). This outcome is better than the case with lim-
ited commitment and information disclosure of ut+1. Thus if the CB is ever
to commit to a simple rule, it will choose not to include ut+1 and not be
transparent about its realization, showing that the gains from not releasing
private information about ut+1 is not particular to discretionary settings.
It is possible to generalize the commitment case by considering the uncon-
strained commitment solution; that is the optimal policy rule under commit-
ment is not constrained to take the functional form of the rule under limited
commitment. In that case, it can be shown that the targeting rule is




16which looks similar to the discretionary case, except that now there is an
additional lagged term, xt−1, indicating history dependence (see for example
Woodford (1999a)). The desirability of secrecy about ut+1 holds true also
under unconstrained commitment. It is also interesting to see that when
α = λ the above rule is identical that derived from a discretionary policy that
targets the nominal income growth (for a thorough discussion of nominal
income targeting, see Hall and Mankiw (1994)). Thus our results also go
through for nominal income targeting.
5 Unobserved CB preferences, credibility and
signaling
This section modiﬁes section 3 in two ways. First, as in Faust and Svensson
(1999) and Jensen (2000), the model includes unobserved shifts in the CB’s
output target. This introduces an inﬂation bias as the output target can
diﬀer from the natural rate, assumed to be zero. In addition, the timing of
events is such that the CB chooses its policy before PS inﬂation expectations
are set. In principle, this implies that the PS can infer in part the output
target from CB actions.
As will be shown below, the relevance of disclosing forecasts of future shocks
is not clear cut and depends on speciﬁc assumptions about the unobserved
output target. Speciﬁcally, the CB is better oﬀ by withholding its private
information about future shocks if the shift in output target is observed with
a one period lag. On the other hand if the output target is not revealed in
subsequent periods, disclosure policy is irrelevant for period-t outcomes. In
any case, however, advance disclosure is not optimal.
Suppose in period t the CB has private information about the supply shock
ut+1 while ut is common knowledge. Somewhat similar to Jensen (2000), the
policy game is played for three periods where the Phillips equation for period
t is given by
πt = E
p
t πt+1 + λxt + ut t = 1,2,3 u1 = u3 = 0
In Jensen (2000), the subject of interest lies in u1, which is assumed to be
private information of the CB while (implicitly) u2 is unknown in period 1; its
value is set to zero as period 2 is interpreted to be the long-run.21 Suppose
21Thus Jensen considers only two periods.
17instead that in period 1, u1 is common knowledge (u1 = 0 for simplicity)
while u2 is CB’s private information, in line with our interest in forecasts of
future shocks. Period 3 has u3 = 0, as it represents the long-run.
Without loss of generality, ignore discounting and take the CB loss function
deﬁned over three periods
U = L1 + L2 + L3
Lt = π
2
t + α(xt − x
∗
c)




0 > 0 and θ ∼ N(0,σ2
θ). While the PS knows the param-
eter x∗
0, which is the CB’s output target determined in period 0, a persistent
shock θ to the output target occurs in period 1 and is private information of
the CB.22 Thus in period 1, the PS faces uncertainty about the preference
shock θ and the CB’s forecast of u2. The model is solved backward starting
from period 3. Since the policy horizon is ﬁnite and markets are forward-
looking, a terminal condition for inﬂation expectations must be assumed for
period 3 (see Jensen (2000) in this regard). The economy stays in a full in-
formation steady state from period 3 onwards, implying π3 = π4, E
p
3π4 = π4













0 + θ) + λx3)




with respect to x3. It is easy to get the solution for x3, and in turn for π3






These are the steady state values for output and inﬂation. There is an inﬂa-
tion bias as long as x∗
c > 0.
Next consider period 2. First E
p
2π3 follows from the solution for π3 in (21).
We consider two cases based on the PS’s knowledge of θ in period 2. It turns
out that the welfare eﬀects of disclosing u2 in period 1 depends on the case
considered.
22The shock to the output target may represent political pressures on the CB or changes
in the composition of the decision making committee of the CB. See for e.g. Faust and
Svensson (1999).
23As Jensen rightly points out, the exact expression for the terminal condition is not
that important for the desirability of the release of forecasts in period 1. The particular
value chosen for the terminal period simpliﬁes the algebra.
18case 1: θ is known in period 2
When θ is common knowledge in period 2, E
p
2π3 = α(x∗
0 + θ)/λ = E
p
3π4. In
other words, PS inﬂation expectations are identical in periods 2 and 3. The
solution for x2 is similar to that in period 3, except for the fact that u2 is
not necessarily zero. Analogous to period 3, the solutions for x2 and π2 are
x2 = −
λ





0 + θ) +
α
α + λ2u2 (22)
The implication of (22) for period 1 is that, the PS has to forecast not only
θ but also u2. Since the state variables are θ and u2, the conjecture for x1 is
x1 = h0 + h2u2 + hθθ (23)
where the coeﬃcients will be determined later. Since the PS observes x1 but
not u2 and θ, it can construct a signal s1 from (23) to infer about u2 and θ
s1 ≡ x1 − h0 = h2u2 + hθθ (24)






























0 + Sθs1) +
α
α + λ2Sus1 (26)
Anticipating the conjecture and the signal extraction problem solved by the








0 + Sθs1) +
α
α + λ2Sus1 + λx1)












0 + Sθs1) +
αSus1





α + λ2 + λ) + α(x1 − x
∗
0 − θ)]
Because the CB observes u2 and θ, it follows that Ec
1s1 = h2u2 + hθθ. Using
this fact, the ﬁrst order condition for x1 can be expressed as a function of
19u2, θ and a constant. Then the undetermined coeﬃcients must satisfy the
following equalities
h0 = −
α2[(λ2 + α)Sθ + λSu]x∗
0
λ2((λ2 + α)(λ2 + α + αSθ) + αλSu)
hθ =
αλ2
αλ2 + (λ2 + αSθ)2 + 2αλ(α + λ2)−1(λ2 + αSθ)Su + (αλSu)2
h2 = −
h2α[(λ2 + α)Sθ + λSu][(λ2 + α)(λ2 + αSθ) + αλSu]
λ2(λ2 + α)((λ2 + α)(λ2 + α + αSθ) + αλSu)
The system of equations can be solved recursively starting with the last equa-
tion for h2. It can be easily shown that h2 → 0 regardless of the degree of
transparency. This means that whether or not it releases its private informa-
tion, the CB does not respond to u2 in equilibrium, and the PS expects this
to happen. From (25) h2 → 0 implies Su → 0 (the signal s1 is not informative
at all about u2) while Sθ → 1/hθ. Next from the second equation hθ → 0
and thus Sθ → ∞. This shows that PS expectations react very strongly to
the signal (which is related one-to-one with CB action x1), forcing the CB












Since x1 does not respond to u2 the PS can infer the value of θ from the signal
s1; this occurs with or without transparency. On the other hand equilibrium
inﬂation in period 1 depends on the release of u2. With full transparency, π1








α + λ2u2 (28)
If u2 is made known to PS in period 1, E
p
1π2 is set such that the CB ﬁnds it
optimal not to react to u2; thus u2 disrupts only π1. When u2 is not disclosed





20It is clear that communicating u2 to the PS in period 1 makes inﬂation more
volatile while leaving output unaﬀected by u2. Therefore, the CB does not
have the incentive to release its private information about u2 in period 1,
before PS inﬂation expectations are formed. This is in line with the result
in section 3. The CB is better oﬀ by not disclosing its forecasts of ut+1 in
period t. The only diﬀerence is that now period-t output is not aﬀected by
disclosure of ut+1 while in section 3 it was shown to be more volatile with
the release of ut+1.
Next consider the second case.






1θ)/λ as the PS has to forecast the value of θ.
Since the relevant state variables are θ and u2, conjecture the following form
for x2
x2 = h0 + h2u2 + hθθ (30)
where the coeﬃcients are yet undetermined. Since the PS observes x2 and
u2, it can construct a signal s2 from (30) to make inferences about θ.
s2 ≡ x2 − h0 − h2u2 = hθθ (31)
It is straightforward to see from (31) that PS expectations of θ given the
signal s2 is given by E
p
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0 + Sθs2) + λx2 + u2)(
α
λ
Sθ + λ) + α(x2 − x
∗
0 − θ)]
Using this fact Ec
2s2 = hθθ, x2 can be expressed as a function of u2, θ and a




λ2(α + λ2 + αSθ)
h2 = −
λ2 + αSθ
λ(α + λ2 + αSθ)
21hθ =
αλ2
αλ2 + (λ2 + αSθ)2
Solve recursively starting with hθ, which gives the solution hθ → 0.24 It
follows that Sθ → ∞. This shows that PS expectations react very strongly
to the signal s2 (which is related one-to-one with CB action x2), forcing the
CB not to respond to its preference shock θ. Finally, the ﬁrst two equations





0 h2 = −
1
λ













The intuition for this result is as follows. Period 2 output and inﬂation may
deviate from the steady state levels for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is due to a
non-zero realization of u2, which is absorbed completely by output.25 Second,
strong dependence of PS inﬂation expectations on output signals forces the
CB care about its reputation. Thus in contrast to case 1, where the PS has
full information about θ, the fact that the PS expectations are very sensitive
to CB action, x2, induces the CB not to respond to the preference shock θ.
Comparing (22) and (32), we see that the solutions for x1 and π1 in period
1 depend on the case at hand, because the CB chooses x1 anticipating the
value of E
p
1π2, which changes from one case to another. Analogous to case




1θ)/λ. Next, as the state variables are θ and
u2, the conjecture and the signaling equations are identical to case 1 (see
(23), (24) and (25)). Then E
p
























Sθ + λ) + α(x1 − x
∗
0 − θ)]
24Note here that there is no role for disclosure of forecasts because u2 is common knowl-
edge.
25compare with (22).
22Because the CB observes u2 and θ, we have Ec
1s1 = h2u2 +hθθ. Then x1 can





λ2 + α + αSθ
hθ =
αλ2
αλ2 + (λ2 + αSθ)2
h2 = −
h2αSθ(λ2 + αSθ)
λ2(λ2 + α + αSθ)
Again, the above equations can be solved recursively starting with the last
equation for h2, which gives h2 → 0 regardless of the degree of transparency.
Moreover, h2 → 0 implies Sθ → 1/hθ. Next from the second equation hθ → 0
and thus Sθ → ∞. Thus, as in case 1, PS expectations of θ react very strongly
to the signal, keeping the CB from responding to θ. Finally, the ﬁrst equa-
tion implies h0 = 0.
Using the above results, equilibrium output in period 1 is
x1 = 0 (33)
Thus, as in case 1, x1 does not react to u2. But there is a diﬀerence with
respect to x∗
0 because now x1 is at the natural rate, unaﬀected by x∗
0. The
intuition for this result is that in period 2, the CB chooses x2 such that π2
is insulated from the eﬀect of x∗
0, depending only on θ.26 By contrast, under
case 1, π2 is aﬀected by x∗
0. This eﬀect is anticipated by the PS in period 1
and thus incorporated in setting E
p
1π2 and in turn π1.





which is not aﬀected by the release of u2. Thus communicating u2 to the PS
in period 1 is irrelevant to welfare.
26The CB behaves in this way in period 2 because the PS can infer perfectly the value
of θ from the signal s1.
236 Summary and conclusion
Some CBs do not disclose their internal forecasts to the public in a timely
manner, and even if they did, it is not clear if they would report their true
forecasts, or if they adjust them so as to simply follow the markets, as Romer
and Romer (2000) indicated in their study of the Federal Reserve of the U.S.
where forecasts are published only with a long time lag so that the value of
the published information becomes negligible.
Recent theory on transparency has not settled the question about welfare
gains from advance disclosure of CB forecasts. Existing research has ana-
lyzed this question assuming private information about current shocks, as
these shocks have direct impact on current economic variables, such as inﬂa-
tion and output, that a CB is interested in stabilizing. Based on this notion
of private information, a few empirical studies on transparency lend support
to the argument that disclosure of CB forecasts can enhance the reputation
and ﬂexibility of monetary policy.
This paper explored the signiﬁcance of private information on future shocks
as forecasts of future shocks are crucial when inﬂation expectations are for-
ward looking. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future
shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases not desirable as it impairs
stabilization of current inﬂation and/or output. This result holds when there
is no credibility problem or the CB’s output target is common knowledge.
When there is uncertainty about the CB’s current output target, and this
uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance disclosure does
not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong dependence
of one-period-ahead PS inﬂation forecasts on CB actions, which induces the
CB to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent periods. Another
implication of the model is that, in contrast to forecasts of current period
shocks emphasized by the literature, forecasts of future shocks may not be
revealed to the public by current policy choices because the CB refrains from
responding to its own forecasts.
With respect to the signaling role of current policy actions about internal
forecasts, private information about future shocks has a diﬀerent policy im-
plication than that of current shocks. While current shocks may be revealed
by current CB actions, this may not be true for forecasts of future shocks.
The intuition is that forecasts of future shocks do not inﬂuence the setting of
current policy if the public is not aware of them; the CB responds to current
shocks only. If the it has information about market expectations, it is opti-
24mal from the CB’s perspective to announce only what the markets already
know.
Even though disclosing information seems counter-intuitive, as it improves
the accuracy of PS inﬂation forecast, the negative result on welfare is a conse-
quence of the CB having objectives other than price stability. With multiple
macroeconomic goals, releasing internal forecasts before the public has cur-
rently formed expectations of future shocks, and thus future inﬂation, can
actually impair overall stabilization eﬀorts.
The result about the destabilizing eﬀect of early disclosure of forecasts goes
through for some alternative speciﬁcations, as long as there is full informa-
tion regarding CB preferences. In the case of the New-Keynesian model,
the results go through for a loss function that includes interest rate stabi-
lization objective, on top of inﬂation and output; or if the CB targets nom-
inal income growth, instead of inﬂation and output, as proposed by some
economists. Moreover, whether policy is conducted under discretion or some
form of commitment is inconsequential to the main result. Our conjecture
is that the results also apply if we drop rational expectations and assume in
line with the learning literature that the PS and/or the CB adaptively learn
about the structure of the economy, adjusting their forecasts with the arrival
of new data. All that is needed for our results is that the CB has superior
information about future supply shocks.
25Appendix: Expected inﬂation when the CB
adopts a policy of limited commitment















k[(1 − λAc)ut+k − λBcut+k+1]
= (1 − λAc)ut − λBcEtut+1 + β[(1 − λAc)Etut+1 − λBcEtut+2] +    
Since the shocks are white noise, PS inﬂation expectations when the CB fully
discloses the value of ut+1 is given by
Etπt+1 = (1 − λAc)ut+1
which is the expression following equation (15) in the main text.
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